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Abstract 
 
This article considers the application to regional price data of time series methods to test 
stationarity, multivariate cointegration and exogeneity. The discovery of stationary price 
differentials in a bivariate setting implies that the series are rendered stationary by capturing a 
common trend and we observe through this mechanism long-run arbitrage. This is indicative of a 
broader market definition and efficiency. The problem is considered in relation to more than 700 
weekly data points on gasoline prices for three regions of the US and similarly calibrated simulated 
series. The discovery of a single common trend is consistent with competitive pricing and a broad 
market definition, but the finding of a single weakly exogenous variable affects this conclusion. 
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Introduction 
 
The article considers the problem of analyzing product price inter-relatedness to determine 
whether markets are competitive. This notion goes back to earlier analysis undertaken in the 70s 
(Maunder, 1972), but these studies pre-date the application of tests of stationarity and a well 
developed understanding of this issue in the economics literature. An interesting survey of the 
application of time series methods to explain pricing discrepancies and test for the existence of a 
causal relation that underlies pricing behaviour was prepared by LecG in 1999 for the United 
Kingdom Office of Fair Trade (OFT). Forni (2004) reported on a study that he prepared on milk 
pricing across Italy. It was suggested that tests under the alterative and the null of stationarity can 
be applied as an effective and efficient way of analyzing anti-trust cases associated with market 
concentration and non-competitive pricing. Tests of stationarity in the context of a price 
differential are essentially tests of cointegration between price series and cointegration is viewed 
in this sense as a signal of a broad market definition that is consistent with arbitrage (Forni, 2004). 
The cointegration case has been used to determine competitiveness in a number of studies, see De 
Vany and Walls (1999), Hendry and Juselius (2001) and La Cour and Møllgaard (2002). 
 
In this article we discuss further the developments in the literature previously summarized in 
Hendry and Juselius (2001). We find that beyond the narrow regional and geographical arguments 
that apply to the study of Forni (2004), it would seem difficult to concede that stationarity tests 
applied to determine that price proportions are stationary can dominate the richer analysis that can 
be drawn from the cointegration approach. We feel that the approach that is developed from testing 
stationarity has some potential pitfalls that may not be recognized when all one is interested in is 
the behaviour of a ratio. As is explained by Hendry and Juselius, there are occasions when tests of 
stationarity may be more effective and more efficient, but they are conditioned on the prior 
observation that the model underlying this approach is valid. 
 
Firstly we provide a brief summary of the literature on stationarity and error correction, but draw 
the reader’s attention to the quite considerable literature on the use of statistical methods to assess 
anti-trust cases.i Then we consider a trivariate extension of the model analyzed by Hendry and 
Juselius (2001). Finally we develop an empirical example to motivate our analysis and then make 
our conclusions. 
 
Stationarity tests and measures of market definition 
 
The notion that an analysis of price behaviour might be used to detect irregularities in pricing can 
be found in studies such as Maunder (1972). As is correctly explained by Forni (2004), this 
discussion predates an appropriate understanding of the pitfalls that arise when inference is 
undertaken on time series that are non-stationary. Forni (2004) has addressed this issue by 
suggesting that some form of test of stationarity can be applied to logarithmic data on prices. 
Specifically, Forni applies his analysis to data on a homogenous product to determine whether 
there are local markets for milk in Italy. The analysis is undertaken on a relatively small data set, 
the bivariate comparisons are applied inter-regionally and they relate to homogenous products 
where local legislation places a limit on the capacity to sell the product easily across Italy. Forni, 
considers two forms of test and sets up a framework by which the combination of tests under the 
null of stationarity and the null of non-stationarity might be used to determine a market definition. 
This operates from narrow through to less narrow to broad depending on the level at which the 
tests are accepted. Here, we will concentrate on the model that underlies the well known Dickey 
Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) as they correspond best with the methods used to determine 
cointegration (Engle and Granger, 1987) and Johansen (1995). 
 
Firstly, we will consider the reasons behind the approach of Forni (2004); subsequently we will 
compare that with the approach of De Vany and Walls (1999), then place this in the context of the 
discussion in Hendry and Juselius (2001) and consider further cointegration and exogeneity. 
 
Forni (2004) suggests the use of stationarity and non-stationarity tests of the log price ratio to 
determine a broad (stationary) as compared with a narrow (non-stationary) market. If the prices 
respond to each other, then the market is competitive, otherwise it is not and the market is narrowly 
defined.ii More recent studies apply univariate and panel tests (Giulietti et al, 2010, and Hunter 
and Tabaghdehi 2012). 
 
There is an extensive literature on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) that has tested this proposition in 
the long-run by determining whether the real exchange rate is stationary. Let: 
 
12 1 2t t t te p p     
 
measure the real exchange rate, then we can apply a number of tests to determine the proposition 
that ( t ) is either stationary or non-stationary. It is generally accepted that either the series 12te , 
1tp  and 2tp  need all to be I(1) or that 12te  and ( 1 2t tp p ) are I(1).iii When this approach is 
applied to the case of regulation, then: 
1 2 .t t tp p    
 
The Dickey-Fuller test associated with both the cases above is related to the following short-run 
dynamic model: 
0 1 1t t t            (1) 
 
t  is stationary when 1 <0 or the price ratio defines a stationary combination so the two prices 
respond to each other. Otherwise, t  is non-stationary when 1 =0 and 
 
0 .t t      
 
Hence t  follows a random walk with drift when 0 0 and: 
  
0 1 .t t t       
 
The often made conclusion when the null hypothesis is accepted is that real exchange rates are 
non-stationary or in the regulation case that the prices do not define an appropriate market. 
However, the t-test applied to (1) is not a simple test of the proposition that a series is stationary 
(under the alternative) it is a test of the proposition that two or more series are stationary in 
combination or rather deducting part of one series from another renders the first series stationary. 
Firstly, we consider the problems that arise by not considering (1) above to be a model of either 
price, then we move on to discuss the approach adopted in De Vany and Walls (1999). The latter 
study realizes that the model estimated by the application of the Dickey Fuller test is one of a 
sequence of restrictions associated with the proposition that the series are cointegrated or rendered 
stationary by some linear combination of variables. The Dickey-Fuller test applied to the log 
proportion of two series relates to a restricted dynamic econometric model: 
 
1 2 0 1 1 2 1( ) ( ) .t t t t tp p p p            
 
It appears clear that Forni (2004) views this model (underlying the Dickey Fuller test) as a model 
of 1tp , because he also undertakes the reverse test that should relate to - t .  
 
Kremers et al (1992) show that the model underlying the Dickey Fuller test applied by Forni 
(2004) is a special case of an error correction model (see Davidson et al (1978)): 
 
    1 0 0 2 1 1 1 2 1( ) .                                (2)t t t t tp p p p             
   
When compared with (1), (2) assumes that 01. The test of stationarity for the price proportions is 
still based on a null of non-stationarity when 1=0 as compared with an alternative of stationarity 
when 1< 0, but in this instance when the sample is large enough Kremers et al (1992) show that 
the t-test can be compared with points on the normal distribution (-1.64). For smaller samples the 
critical values correspond more closely with those of Dickey and Fuller (1979) as applied to the 
cointegration case (Engle and Granger, 1987). However, efficient inference on all the coefficients 
of the model depends on the proposition that p2t is weakly exogenous for the parameters of 
interest (1), this requires a sequential cut in the parameter space, between the parameters of the 
model driving the price series (see Engle, Hendry and Richard, 1983 or Ericsson and Irons, 1994). 
If the null is accepted, then there may still be a short-run relation between prices when 1=0, but 
this is between price inflation series for different firms or regions. Therefore: 
 
1 0 0 2 .t t tp p        
 
Secondly, there may be a non proportional relationship between prices in the long-run (Hosken 
and Taylor, 2004) so the error correction model to be estimated is: 
Δp1t  0  0Δp2t  1p1t−1 − p2t−1  t.
 
Hence, the test used by Forni (2004) might not be able to reject the null hypothesis that (p1t-1 - p2t-1) 
is non-stationary, when either 01 and the Dickey-Fuller test is not appropriate or 01, and 
neither the Dickey-Fuller nor the Kremers et al (1992) error correction tests are correctly 
formulated. In the latter case an estimate of elasticity which is non-unity may still imply slightly 
inelastic price response or an infinitely elastic price response.iv 
 
Further, the regulation literature does not come to the conclusion, that stationarity tests alone can 
be used to detect discriminatory or unfair pricing. In the PPP literature, Banerjee et al (2005) 
suggest that the single equation or panel approach are not always correct, because they may miss 
out on the important cross sectional dependence between price series, the exchange rate and other 
fundamental factors that can also influence the real exchange rate.v There is also some evidence 
from the empirical literature based on multivariate tests of cointegration that the proportionality 
restriction associated with PPP can be accepted when series are modelled jointly (Johansen and 
Juselius, 1992, and Juselius, 1995). The latter point seems very important for the validity of 
univariate analysis of relative price behaviour as unlike PPP there may be additional reasons for 
price movements not to match each other. 
 
In the case of PPP it is important that the basket of goods be comparable. Lothian (2012) who 
analyses 400 years of price and exchange rate data for Great Britain and Holland provides 
evidence for the importance of the nature of the price series and compares a range of different 
historical price series across this period. The key issue in the context of pricing of products relates 
to the homogeneity of the product. A similar point is made by Hosken and Taylor (2004) in their 
reply to Forni and they suggest for non-homogenous products that it may be likely to find 
non-proportionality in the price relations. The price discrepancies may be amenable to 
transformation and this relates to the discussion in Hunter et al (2001) of the use of hedonic pricing 
to correct for quality differences in data. This would provide a basis for differences between the 
short and the long-run coefficients. While for the case of mature products such distinctions may 
relate to constant and dummy corrections though there may be slow moving effects related to 
vintages that may not be captured in this type of way. 
 
Cointegration and Exogeneity 
 
De Vany and Walls (1999) apply a different approach to the problem, firstly they test individual 
price series to determine the order of integration, then subject to finding that the series are at most 
I(1) they test the proposition that combinations of prices are stationary and then they determine 
whether the response is unitary elastic. This has the advantage over the analysis of Forni (2004) 
that it does not presume an order of integration as it makes no assumption about the normalization 
of prices in the long-run or about the exogeneity of the variables. Consider the conventional Vector 
Auto-Regressive model in error correction form: 
 
1
1
1
.                                (3)
q
t t i t i t
i
x x x 

 

        
 
Now xt may be viewed as containing variables for product i and j, which for the case considered by 
Forni (2004) and De Vany and Walls (1999) means that xt=[p1t p2t]. Now there are N potentially 
cointegrating relationships, though only one of them will be valid when the series are of the same 
order of integration and there are N=2 price series to be analyzed as is the case in the previous 
section. When the underlying distribution is normal, then the VAR can be transformed into a first 
order model and that can be viewed as a multivariate generalization of the model analyzed by 
Dickey and Fuller (1979). So least squares can be used to estimate of  from the multivariate 
residual regression: 
1, 0, .t tR R error    
From the point of view of maximum likelihood estimation, this is equivalent to concentrating the 
likelihood function. As long as a Gaussian likelihood is used, the maximum likelihood estimator of 
 is also unaffected, even under the restriction that the matrix is of reduced rank, r<N. The 
estimates of the long-run derive from the decomposition: 
   
   
 
where  and  are Nr matrices of loadings and cointegrating relationships respectively. The 
requirement for Gaussianity means that the disturbances, t must be jointly normally distributed, 
an important assumption. Therefore the likelihood ratio test determines the null (H0) and 
alternative (HA) hypotheses, for j=1, 2... N where: 
  
0 : 1
: .A
H r j
H r j
 
  
The test statistic is:  
LRj − 1,N  −T ∑
ij
N
log1 −  i    tracej − 1.
 
Johansen (1995) presents critical values for the trace test for cointegration, which follows a 
non-standard distribution under the null of non-stationarity. In general there is an N vector of 
variables xt assumed to define one or more long-run relationships (xt) that are assumed to be 
stationary. 
 
To consider exogeneity in the long-run we analyze the matrix of long-run parameters () in (3), 
the Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) in error correction form. Partitioning  into blocks of 
cointegrating vectors associated with yt (endogenous variables) and those related to zt (exogenous 
variables): 
 
1,1 1,2
2,1 2,2
 12
1
2
′

11′ 12′
21′ 22′
 
where 1 is N1r, 2, N2r, 1 is an N1r, and 2 an N2r matrix. A necessary condition for weak 
exogeneity of zt for a sub-block .1 = [1,1 2,1] is a block triangular  matrix:  
 
1,1 1,2
0 2,2
.
 
However, the triangular form is not sufficient for weak exogeneity, which is combined with the 
condition: 
1 1
1,2 1,2 2,2 2,2 1,2 1,2 2,2 2,2( ) 0 ( ) 0.or            
Hence, we require further restrictions for appropriate long-run inference in a conditional model. 
These two conditions are necessary and sufficient for weak exogeneity of zt for the sub-block .1. It 
follows that weak exogeneity for a sub-block occurs when the condition 2,1=0 is extended to a 
quasi diagonal form:  
1,1
2,2
0
.
0
 
    
 
 
Where 11,2 1,2 2,2 2,2( ) 0     or either 2,2 or 11,2 2,2( ) 0     . Otherwise 1,2 2,2  and: 
 
1,1 2,2
2,2
.
0
  
    
 
 
The loadings in the first and second blocks are to  proportional to each other. In the case where 
1,2 0,  then weak exogeneity of zt for the matrix  occurs when 2,2 0   and: 
 
1,1 1,2 1,1 2,11,1 1,2
2,1 2,2 2,1 2,2
1,1 1,1 1,2 2,1 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2
0 0
.
0 0
  
 
       
 
 
   
                 
     
 
 
As a result the cointegrating vectors are estimated from the block of equations related to y. Notice 
that there are at most N-r weakly exogenous variables in this sense or the fundamental criterion for 
cointegration is broken. 
 
Cointegrating exogeneity augments the triangular  with non-causality between y and z at the level 
of the system. Hence, the long-run relationships for z do not depend on the levels of y. It follows 
that zttt  is cointegrating exogenous for the sub-vector .1, if and only if: 
  
2,1 0.   
 
Following Hunter (1990) this form of separating cointegration is quite arbitrary in that any 
orthogonal combination of 1 and 2 sub-blocks satisfy (ii). However, when .1 defines the 
parameters of interest, then the partition 2 11[0 : ]   and 1 1,1[ : 0]   are the only ones that 
are relevant. This gives rise to the following matrix of long-run parameters (Hunter, 1992): 
 
1,1 1,21,1 1,2 1,1 2,1
2,22,1 2,2 2,2
1,1 1,1 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2
2,2 2,2
0 0
.
0
   
 
     
 
 

  

                   
     
 
With CE, ,i j and ,i j are dimensioned ( )j jr N and the following vectors: 1 .1t tx    and 
2 2,2t tz    define r1 and r2 blocks of stationary variables. 
 
If conditions (i) and (ii) above hold, then cointegrating exogeneity in this form is an exact analogue 
of strong exogeneity (see Engle et al, 1983). 
 
Next we consider cointegration in the confines of the system due to De Vany and Walls (1999) and 
provide a more general case related to equilibrium price targeting (Burke and Hunter, 2011). 
 
Simple Cointegration tests of Market Definition 
 
Let us assume that a single relationship of the variety tested in the papers by Forni (2004) and De 
Vany and Walls (1999) exists, then: 
i′x t  1 − 1
p1t
p2t
 I0.
 
Hence, the hypothesis accepted is 1 2 (0)t tp p I  . In the case considered by both Forni (2004) and 
De Vany and Walls (1999) the system contains two equations for each price pair analyzed. This 
implies for two I(1) variables there is a maximum of r=1 meaningful long-run relations. The 
Johansen test statistic, tests for the number of long-run relations, but without restriction they are 
not automatically identified. In the case where 1 1 2 1[ ]t t tx p p

  , then the cointegrating vector is 
identified by a normalization therefore an acceptable matrix is [1  12 ]. Once the normalization 
is imposed, then a t-test of the proposition that 12 1    can be undertaken using the critical 
values for the parameters in  and  derived by Doornik (1998).vi For the case where the order of 
integration is the same, the model analyzed by Forni (2004) is a special case of that analyzed by De 
Vany and Walls (1999). For ease of exposition we will consider the bivariate VAR(2), with x and  
defined above,   and one cointegrating vector: 
Δx t  1112
 1 12 x t−1 −
11 12
21 22
Δx t−i  t.
 
This is observationally equivalent to a non-singular transformation matrix A that following 
pre-multiplication gives rise to the following system.  
11
12 1
12
11 12
21 22
1 2 11 12
12 1
2 12
1 211 21 12 22
221 22
1 1
[1 ]
0 1
1 1 1 1
0 1 0 1
[1 ]
.
t t
t i t
t t
t
t
t t
t i
t
A x x
x
p p
x
p
x
 
   
  
    
 




          
               
          
            
 
 
Notice, that the transformation makes no difference to the long-run equations. For inference in the 
single equation to be equivalent to inference that arises in the VAR we require the following 
restrictions to hold, 12 22 0,    12 0  and 12 1   :  
 
1 2 11
12 1
2
1 211 21
1
221 22
[1 ]
0
0
.
t t
t
t
t t
t
t
p p
x
p
x
 
  
 


          
           
 
 
In the case of Forni (2004), the Dickey-Fuller test imposes the restriction 12 1   on the long-run 
and also imposes the same restrictions on the short-run dynamics of an error correction model that 
contains no cross price terms or 12 22.   When the VAR is compared with the single equation 
error correction framework then inference is optimal in the long-run as this is efficiently estimated 
on a single equation when p2t is weakly exogenous for the cointegrating vector  or the long-run is 
only derived from the first equation or 12 0.  If it makes no difference whether or not: 
 
 
A∗  1 0−1 1    
 
is applied to the VAR, then the same results should arise from the Dickey Fuller test irrespective of 
the nature of the price comparison, except that the condition for weak exogeneity is required and 
11 21 0   . 
  
The model discussed by Hendry and Juselius (2001) is a simple generalization of De Vany and 
Walls (1999) where the price of a substitute is included, the price of oil. The first issue that arises 
in the study by Hendry and Juselius (2001), which would appear to apply to an analysis of 
competitive markets is that the price series have a common trend. To enliven our discussion we 
will assume that the two prices considered relate to gas. If there is a single common trend across 
related prices, then all prices should be driven by the common trend for the market to be 
competitive. Following Forni (2004), De Vany and Walls (1999), and Hendry and Juselius (2001) 
it is suggested that the single cointegrating vector takes the form [1 -1] that is suggested as being 
consistent with a broad market definition. Both Forni (2004), and De Vany and Walls (1999) 
develop studies that though bivariate in nature relate to a number of inter-related prices. And these 
authors suggest that the same behaviour is required for competitiveness for all the products 
without considering the likely interactions that might arise when cross prices are analyzed. Both 
these studies end up rejecting the broad market definition on the basis of their bivariate analysis 
without apparently considering that the specification might be limiting. Hendry and Juselius 
(2001) introduce a third related product, which is a comparable price based on the broad industry 
classification of energy and extraction industries and on the basis of the mode of extraction that 
might be viewed as having a similar underlying cost structure to gas. Oil the third price has 
features in common with gas and the nature of such features can be explored. Specifically, the 
market for gas and oil might be driven by a single common trend, not a hypothesis posited by 
Hendry and Juselius, but the gas market might be conditioned on oil and this has implications for 
efficient estimation. Finally for the energy market to be efficient, the gas market ought to react to 
shocks in the oil market. Hendry and Juselius also consider the role of the trend in the cointegrating 
relationship and the dynamic model, and consider the nature of leader follower behaviour. In the 
next section we will consider the role of a trivariate model similar in nature to that of Hendry and 
Juselius (2001) and extend this to multivariate models which might yield slightly different 
conclusions to those offered by Forni (2004), and De Vany and Walls (1999).vii 
 
Multi-price correspondence and Market Definition 
 
In this section the question of price comparison is addressed firstly in the confines of a trivariate 
price system similar to that analyzed by Hendry and Juselius (2001). The principle espoused in the 
confines of the bivariate case by Hendry and Juselius (2001) that competition implies a common 
trend driving corresponding prices across homogenous product markets appears to generalize to a 
multi-price framework. We pay particular attention to the role of the common trend in the context 
of these models and the role of exogeneity in explaining the competitive structure and price 
inter-relatedness in a market. 
 
Following Hendry and Juselius (2001) we consider the conventional VAR (2) model with three 
inter-related market prices. For cointegration when all the series are I(1) there are at most 
1r N   cointegrating relationships and corresponding to them 1N r   common trends. The 
Johansen trace test outlined in the previous section determines the number of cointegrating vectors 
r and the number of common trends when the series are not of a higher order of integration. For the 
trivariate case we will start with r=2. Therefore: 
Δ
p1t
p2t
p3t

11 12
21 22
31 32
1 21 31
12 1 32
p1t−1
p2t−1
p3t−1
−
11 12 13
21 22 23
31 32 33
Δx t−1 
1t
2t
3t
.
 
As is stated in Hendry and Juselius (2001), the above model has unrestricted matrices  with rN 
parameters and  that after normalization has r(N-1) parameters. As is discussed in Burke and 
Hunter (2005) there is a simple order condition that requires 2j r r   restrictions to the 
parameters in the matrix pair  .   Prior to such restrictions  and  are not identified. This is 
before any consideration of the nature of the cointegrating vectors that are consistent with some 
form of market definition. Following, Boswijk (1992), Hunter and Simpson (1996) and Bauwens 
and Hunter (2000) it is possible to identify either via restrictions on  alone,  alone, and  and . 
However, some combinations of cross restrictions may not be valid (Toda and Phillips, 1995). 
 
Here, we will explain the primary condition required for a competitive market, then the 
relationship that the primary condition has with long-run weak and cointegrating exogeneity of 
variables in the system and the link with identification. A further discussion of identification is 
considered by Burke and Hunter (2011). 
 
Proposition In the case where the market is competitive and prices are I(1), then all prices in a 
broadly defined market respond positively and in proportion to a single common trend t tp x   
or N-r=1 and (0)it tp p I
   defines a set of N dependent vectors.viii 
 
Proof Assuming that all prices are I(1) then the series has the following common trends 
representation (Johansen (1995)): 
1
0
1 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )                  (4)
t
i
t i i
i i
x Cx C I         
 
          
where 1( ) ,C           ix  defines a drift parameter and xt will be an N vector of prices. 
Then the model with N price series can be decomposed into two blocks that is N-r trends and r 
cointegrating vectors. We isolate the trend component by multiplying (4) by   where 0.     
′ x t  ′ Cx 0  ′ C∑
i1
t
i    ′ ′−1 ∑
i0

I  ′i′i  
 ′ x 0  ′ ∑
i1
t
i  .
 
Setting the initial condition to zero and for the purposes of exposition =0, then the common trend 
can be characterized by: 
′ x t  ′ ∑
i1
t
i.
 
Therefore with N-r=1 a single common trend drives prices. It follows from the Granger 
representation theorem that this single common trend is annihilated by the cointegrating vectors 
that define r stationary variables when the condition for cointegration 0C  is satisfied. To see 
this multiply (4) by :  
′x t  ′Cx 0  ′C∑
i1
t
i  ′′−1 ∑
i0

I  ′i′i
∑
i0

I  ′i′i.
 
This defines r stationary series without restriction on the cointegrating relationships. The 
stationary variables, tx are linear combinations of the prices that return the system to 
equilibrium. For a broad market definition we require the prices to move in proportion to a single 
common trend and r=N-1 cointegrating relationships. It follows from the common trends 
decomposition of the VAR that C= 1( )         is an NN matrix and   is NN-r matrix used 
to define the single common trend. If an adjustment is made for the initial conditions, then the 
common trend can be estimated by .t tx   When t tx    defines a common trend and the 
market is competitive, then: i) 1,    where  is an N1 vector of 1s, ii) for i=1, 2... N , 
(0)it tp p I
  . Consider the price differential, when ,t tp x   and ii, is a vector of zero's except 
for element i set equal to 1, then: 
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If  ( )i n ii I R   , then there are N vectors of the form .  ( )i i ni I    that are dependent. To see 
this consider a trivariate system with  1 2 3       : 
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After normalization: 
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Selecting N-1 cointegrating vectors from :N   
 
′  1 21 3112 1 32
 1
−2
23
−3
23
−1
13 1
−3
13
.
 
This leaves r=N-1 restrictions that exactly identify the cointegrating vectors: 
21  31  −1 and 12  32  −1
or for all i  1,2, . . .N,
∑
j≠i
ji  −1.
 
These restrictions are consistent with (0)it tp p I
   for i=1, 2...N, and 1   .    
 
This is similar to the model in Hendry and Juselius (2001) who state that the cointegrating vectors 
without restriction have four free parameters after normalization. Prior to any further restriction it 
is of interest to note that economic theory implies that all firms ought to react to the underlying 
competitive behaviour, that is per-force associated with a common trend when the series are all 
I(1). The existence of the common trend imposes no restriction on the parameters of the 
cointegrating vectors unless the common trend can be isolated. This might arise when one of the 
equations is viewed as a generalized random walk that occurs when one equation, say the third 
contains no long-run relationships or 31=32=0 and p3t is weakly exogenous for ; for similar 
discussion see Kurita (2008). If a weakly exogenous variable were to be extracted from the system, 
then a less competitive market is observed and the following is a valid normalization: 
 
  
1 0 31
0 1 32
.
 
 
The latter implies that the normalization is not imposed on a variable that can be long-run excluded 
from the system or is not well defined in the respective long-run equation. One might anticipate 
that the cointegrating vectors defined by the system might be driven by one variable. Were this to 
be the case, then one might consider the following structural form: 
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12 1 32
0 0 1
Δ
p1t
p2t
p3t

11 12 − 12
0 −1
0 0
1 21 31
12 1 32
p1t−1
p2t−1
p3t−1
−
11  2112 12  2212 13  2312
21 22 23
0 0 0
Δx t−1

t  122t  133t
2t
3t
 
to elaborate further, the system potentially has a single equation, followed by the primary error 
correction term and then the common trend. Notice that this can be transformed to a VAR by 
inverting the matrix of parameters on the dependent variables. Therefore: 
 
Δ
p1t
p2t
p3t

1 a12 a13
12 1 32
0 0 1
−1

11 12
0 −1
0 0
1 21 31
12 1 32
p1t−1
p2t−1
p3t−1
−
11 12 13
21 22 23
0 0 0
Δx t−1 
1t
2t
3t
 
 
Δ
p1t
p2t
p3t

− 11a 1212−1 −
a 12
a 1212−1 −
12
a 1212−1
11 12a 1212−1
1
a 1212−1  12
12
a 1212−1
0 0
1 21 31
12 1 32
p1t−1
p2t−1
p3t−1
−
− 11a 1212−1  a12
21
a 1212−1 −
12
a 1212−1  a12
22
a 1212−1 −
13
a 1212−1  a12
23
a 1212−1
− 21a 1212−1  12
11
a 1212−1 −
22
a 1212−1  12
12
a 1212−1 −
23
a 1212−1  12
13
a 1212−1
0 0 0
Δx t−1

−  ta 1212−1  a12
2t
a 1212−1 
3t
a 1212−1 a13 − a1232 
12  ta 1212−1 −
2t
a 1212−1 
3t
a 1212−1 32 − a1312 
3t
.
 
It is also suggested that the cointegrating relations still only apply to the first two equations. 
Broadly speaking the analysis in Hendry and Juselius (2001) is similar to that described above. 
The model is essentially the differential between the two equations estimated by the Johansen 
procedure, that restricts any price terms in the first equation to be zero and imposes the condition 
that the second variable is weakly exogenous. Then a bivariate conditional VAR might be 
estimated without affecting the nature of the results on cointegration. However, this had to be 
tested prior to this re-arrangement. 
 
The hypothesis 1 12 2 (0)t tp p I   may not give rise to a unit coefficient, because the prices have 
a different response or the prices relate to variables that are not homogenous or are differentiated in 
some way or other (Hosken and Taylor, 2004). 
 
There might be other prices or other variables, which might legitimately influence the long-run 
relationship.x In the context of PPP, interest rates are often required to make the real exchange rate 
stationary (Johansen and Juselius, 1992 and Juselius, 1995). 
 
Empirical Analysis 
 
Here we consider similar data to Hosken and Taylor (2004), Hunter and Tabaghdehi (2012) and 
Kurita (2008) to analyze the stationarity and cointegration properties of regional gasoline prices in 
the US. The data is similar to that analyzed by Kurita (2008) who took the same regions for the 
period 1990 (week 38) - 2004 (week 52) and this is a subset of the data analyzed by Hunter and 
Tabaghdehi (2012) who consider a broader range of regions. Here the price series are tested for 
stationarity and these results are compared with those related to the Johansen procedure. The data 
are for three regions of the US and the product is a homogenous product (gasoline) except for the 
location. Here three regions are selected, New York (NY), the Gulf Coast (GC) and Lower 
Atlantic (LA). The regions are similar, they are all coastal regions, they each had facilities by 
which crude oil can be imported and refined. 
 
In Figure 1 the logarithms of gasoline prices are given for the data used by Kurita (2008) who 
considers three prices from the regions, New York (NY), Gulf Coast (GC) and Lower Atlantic 
(LA): 
 
    Figure 1: The logarithm of gasoline prices for NY, GC and LA 
 
In Figure 2, the series have also been transformed into log price differentials, so as is explained in 
section 2, the notion of cointegration is tested using Dickey Fuller regressions (Forni, 2004) and 
Error Correction Models (Kremer et al, 1992). 
 
  Figure 2: Logarithmic price differentials: NY and LA, GC and LA, GC and NY. 
 
In Table 1, tests of stationarity are derived from single equations and this is done for comparison 
with the results that derive from the VAR. The effective sample includes T=721 observations and 
the results relate to Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests and Error Correction Models (ECM) 
with q lags in the estimations. 
 
Table 1 Unit root and ECM tests of price‐proportions 
Correction terms t-ADF(q)  t-ecm(q)|pLA  t-vecm(q)| pLA 
PNY-LA  -4.701**(11)   ‐3.72**(11)|pLA ‐3.30**(11)|pLA 
PGC-LA -4.601**(11) ‐3.39**(11)|pLA ‐1.47(11)|pLA 
PGC-NY -5.983**(17) ‐5.31**(17)|pNY ‐5.42**(17)|pNY 
P LA-NY -4.701**(11) ‐4.45**(11)|pNY ‐3.30**(11)|pNY 
* Significant at the 5% level and ** significant at the 1% level. 
 
The results in the first column of Table 1 imply that the price proportions are stationary in each 
case as the critical values are significant when compared at the5 /1% level with a one sided critical 
value of 2.87 / 3.44  as computed in OxMetrics Professional (Doornik and Hendry, 2009). 
Significance implies that the series in this case price proportions are stationary. Stationarity relates 
to price series that follow the same stochastic trend. If that is the case, then the series move in 
proportion to each other in the long-run. Here arbitrage would seem to hold in the long-run, but 
these tests are unable to determine whether the series follow each other. These tests simply imply 
that the log price series render each other stationary and give no direction to the correction. To 
understand the latter it is necessary to analyze all equations in the system. It is of interest to 
observe that the results in the first and the final element of this column are the same as the latter is 
the reverse regression. This suggests that the method developed in Forni (2004) should be limited 
to either the upper or lower triangle of results. Hunter and Tabaghdehi (2012) show that there is an 
exact correspondence to this result for the Dickey Fuller (DF) test and the estimations in the first 
column suggest that this generalizes when q lags appear in the ADF test estimations. 
 
There are instances where it may be appropriate to test using the ADF test. This arises either when 
the sample is small or when the price proportions exhibit less complex time series behaviour. If 
there are common features in the data that cancel then the stationarity tests may reveal an effective 
methodology to determine the nature of the market. As can be observed from Table 1 the dynamic 
in some cases is restricted to 11 and 17 lags, this compares to the VAR that is estimated with 20 
difference terms. However, the approach is limited to finding whether prices move in proportion 
and is not able to determine anything about causality or conditioning. Further, the autoregressive 
(AR) model that underlies the ADF test imposes a common factor restriction on the ECM (Burke 
and Hunter, 2005). 
 
The test is efficient when the model can be restricted so that the prices move in proportion in both 
the long and the short-run. This restriction can be removed by augmenting the DF test with either 
of the price inflation terms. The second column in Table 1 is based on the model underlying the 
ADF test extended by the contemporaneous inflation terms from the second price in each of the 
correction terms ( )itp and their q lags. For conventional inference to be efficient, the augmenting 
price inflation variable is required to be weakly exogenous. However, this is not a problem for the 
test of stationarity on the error correction term as the estimated coefficient is super consistent 
(Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004). Here, these tests are not enhanced by augmentation with the 
price inflation terms, though it cannot be concluded from this that the market is also efficient in a 
short-run sense. Though, the inclusion of the contemporaneous inflation term may be important, 
econometric inefficiency may arise in these estimations, because many of the q-1 lagged price 
inflation terms are likely not to be significant. 
 
For further comparison, the last column in Table 1 relates to the estimation of an associated error 
correction model. In this case the dependent variable is the difference of the first price in the 
correction term, but the model is autoregressive as the contemporaneous price inflation term (
)itp is excluded and to permit the possibility that the cointegrating rank is N-1 a second correction 
term is included. It should be noted that the first and final elements in this column relate to the 
price correction terms NY LAp  and LA NYp  these test statistics are the same, and again this reflects that 
these are reverse regressions. The second element in this column is not significant and this 
emphasizes the difference between the estimation that arises from the correction term ( )GC LAp  and 
a single equation here related to  GCtp  that arises from a vector error correction model. Here the 
error correction term is testing for the importance of cointegration related to a single price 
equation, but insignificance can either arise as the cointegrating relation does not exist or the 
cointegration cannot be detected from that equation. So estimation of a single equation cannot 
discriminate between these two possibilities. The penultimate element in this column yields 
t-statistics that appear not to be materially different across the different models. 
 
The single equation estimation is efficient when they are conditioned on one or more exogenous 
variable, but this cannot be determined by directly estimating one equation and for the equation to 
be well defined, the cointegrating rank should also be determined in advance. As a result further 
discussion of the error correction model is considered in relation to the simulated data as the nature 
of the model is known in that case. 
 
The system estimated is a trivariate unrestricted VAR(21) in error correction form. It can be 
observed from the first row of results in Table 2 that the null of the Johansen trace test can be 
rejected at both the 1% and 5% level. The subsequent element in the trace test relates to 
cointegrating rank of r=3, but as the test is not significant (p.value=[0.281]) so it follows that the
( ) 1 2rank N    . To preclude the possibility of I(2) trends it makes sense to undertake a test 
that will confirm the rank result (Johansen, 1995, and Burke and Hunter, 2005). This is a rank test 
for the null of non-stationarity with respect of the second differences and this is a sufficient 
condition for cointegration. If the I(2) test related to Paruolo (1996) is applied, then with r=2 
cointegrating vectors and N=3 variables, here the key test for I(2) relates to the final statistic on the 
diagonal of the I(2) test table the test term is 1 2,1Q  49.586[0.0000]. The clear significance of this 
test implies that there is a single stochastic trend and with r=2 there is no room for I(2) trends.   
 
Table 2 Tests of cointegration, WE, LE and Parallel Pricing. 
Hypothesis †   Null Statistic [p.value] 
Cointegration| r=1   r ≤ 2  ln(1 ) 20.344[0.007]iT       
(WE)| r=1  pGC   1 0,i   for  1,2i     2 (2) 5.9656[0.0507]    
              pNY   2 0,i   for  1,2i      2 (2) 7.1725[0.0277]   
              pLA   3 0,i   for  1,2i      2 (2) 4.7231[0.0943]    
(LE)| r=1  pLA   1 0,j   for 1,2j     2 (2) 17.699[0.0001]   
             pNY   1 0,j   for 1,2j     2 (2) 31.400[0.0000]   
             pGC   1 0,j   for 1,2j    2 (2) 29.701[0.0000]   
 
Normalization (N)
WEpLA |r  2   
 
 11   22  1,
21  12  0
3i  0, for i  1,2
 2 (2) 4.7231[0.0943]    
 
CEpGC|N
WEpLA |r  2   
 21 0    2 (3) 0.4182[0.5178]   
 
Parallel Pricing | ( )
( ) ( ) | 2
GC
LA
CE p
N WE p r    
 
13
 
23
1     2 (2) 3.7136[0.1562]   
† Cointegrating Exogeneity (CE), Weak Exogeneity (WE) and Long-run Exclusion (LE). *Significant at the 5% level 
and ** significant at the 1% level. 
 
The next block of results in Table 2 relate to WE and from the p.value it can be determined that the 
log price for GC and LA might be WE for. While the test for the price for the NY is significant 
and so WE is rejected at the 1% level of significance. In the next block long-run exclusion (LE) is 
tested (Juselius, 1995). The clear significance of these tests emphasizes the rank condition and the 
likely robustness of inference associated with any normalization of either cointegrating vectors. 
The equations are ordered in relation to the WE test as is suggested in Hunter and Simpson (1996). 
WE is tested for LA on a model normalized on the price for NY in the first equation and the GC in 
the second equation. 
 
Identification requires there to be r-1 restrictions per long-run relation (Hunter and Simpson, 
1996). This can be undertaken in a number of ways, but one that is straightforward relates to what 
is termed the normalization rule by Boswijk (1996). Therefore  2I b    where I2 is the 22 
identity matrix and  1 2 .b b b  This restriction is not binding as it exactly identifies each 
cointegrating vector so as might be observed for the next line in the table the WE test is not 
affected by applying the normalization rule to  . The next row tests for CE by imposing the 
restriction 2,1 0  . This gives rise to a triangular block in  so the long-run equations for GC and 
LA are not long-run caused by the NY price. However, this is seen in Hunter and Simpson (1996) 
as trivial in terms of the first long-run relation as the GC price does not appear in this vector.xi In 
the final block the notion of parallel pricing is tested by imposing the restrictionsb   1 1 .   
As a result these tests give rise to the same conclusions as the stationarity tests. 
 
As Forni (2004) correctly points out the test based on the error correction term simultaneously tests 
parallel pricing along with cointegration. However, it does not consider WE and CE or the 
orientation of the long-run. These issues are considered in more detail when the simulations are 
analyzed. There is further discussion of exogeneity and identification for this type of model in 
Burke and Hunter (2011). 
 
The final set of results in Table 2 are accepted at the 5% level and they yield the following  and  
matrices, and the associated restricted  matrix conditioned on the GC price that is cointegrating 
exogenous and the LA price that is weakly exogenous for : 
 
0.035941
−0.18686
0.040008
−0.11187
0
0.021095
−0.079938
0 0
and ′  1 0 −1
0 1 −1
 
−0.18686 −0.11187 0.29873
0.0 −0.079938 0.079938
0.0 0.0 0.0
 
The final long-run relation exhibits parallel pricing, but in the long-run NY and GC prices depend 
on the prices in LA and there is a long-run structure that is driven by GC prices. That prices in LA 
are WE for  implies that they do not respond in the long-run to prices in NY and GC. The error 
correction may be more appropriately seen as a measure of the degree of mispricing and the 
long-run relations seen as arbitrage correction terms. The results in Table 2 tell us that these 
responses are observed to flow in the direction LA to the other regions and this would suggest that 
the market is not informationally efficient (Hunter and Burke, 2007, and Kurita, 2008). This 
analysis would be strengthened were we to have information on prices at the firm level, but further 
information might be extracted from regional details on the supply of gasoline. Further, these 
results imply that the regulatory authorities would need to be careful to permit any further 
concentration in the industry especially in terms of gas station ownership or refinery capacity in 
LA. Similarly, a further causal feature relates to the GC price being cointegrating exogenous for 
 .1 1 0 1   the first cointegrating vector. 
 
Next the simulated data are considered and the following  matrix imposes WE and  is fixed so 
that there is parallel pricing. The same cointegrating vectors apply in the simulated case as occurs 
with the actual data: 
s 
−. 09 .04
0.11 −. 17
0 0
and s′ 
1 0 −1
0 1 −1 .
 
The following series are calibrated in a similar way to the NY, GC and LA gasoline price series. 
The processes are different from the actual data as they are generated by independent errors that 
are normal, but they behave in a remarkably similar way to the actual data.  
 
 
    Figure 3: Simulated gasoline price series. 
 
Next the same tests are applied to the simulated data. It exhibits similar features to the actual data 
though it is based on a simpler time series structure.xii The series are computed as a system, but the 
table below yields single equation results that follow from the simulated data. It is of interest that 
based on simulated data Haug (1996) found that there was no correlation between the Johansen test 
and the residual based cointegration tests. However, the simulations in Haug were generated under 
the null while the results presented in Table 3 relate to a cointegration case. 
 
Table 3, Unit root and ECM tests of price‐proportions for simulated data. 
Correction terms  1ˆ 1     t − DF    t − ecm   
 p1−3   0.89927 -5.974 ∗∗  -8.09 ∗∗   
 p2−3   0.92059 -5.247 ∗∗   -9.15 ∗∗   
 p3−1   0.89927 -5.974 ∗∗   0.0426 
 p1−2   0.78766 -9.114 ∗∗   -7.19 ∗∗  
* Significant at the 5% level and ** significant at the 1% level. 
 
The data are calibrated using the model previously estimated so it is to be anticipated that the 
computed DF tests give rise to results that satisfy the alternative of stationarity. Hunter and 
Tabaghdehi (2012) suggest that cross restrictions apply to the sequence of tests. As can be seen 
from the DF test on the price proportions in the third column, the test statistics based on the 
simulated data are exactly the same for the price proportions 1 3p   and those for the reverse 
regression using 3 1p  . Hunter and Tabaghdehi (2012) show the exactitude of this result in the case 
where the series follow random walks. This implies that the analysis is at least limited to 
( 1) / 2 3N N    combinations. The lower triangle of results is presented in the table above, but 
these relate to three primary equations for each of the prices. 
 
Under cointegration there are only 1 2r N    long-run relations and this suggests that a similar 
result applies to these regressions for stationarity as arises in the case of cross exchange rates 
derived in Smith and Hunter (1985). Firstly, these equations are coherent when the coefficients on 
the error correction terms are the same. Otherwise any discrepancy implies that the results may 
differ by the extent of the discrepancy in the coefficient on the lagged level. It follows that when 
coherent models are estimated in all cases, only N-1 are considered unique. In this case the 
coefficients on the Dickey Fuller test are relatively similar and so any discrepancy is likely to be 
small. As can be observed from the test that applies to p1-2 this is similar in scale to the value that 
comes from the sum of the tests on p1-3 and p3-2 so the t-value (-9.114) is not materially different 
from -11.221. This calls into question the ordering of tests presented in Forni (2004). Firstly, the 
process has to be limited to the upper or lower triangle of results. Secondly, it seems likely that 
only N-1 of these tests do not depend on the behaviour of the underlying price relations. 
 
The same problem does not apply to the approach that arises when an error correction system is 
estimated. Firstly, this approach corresponds to the estimation of three time series relations. 
Secondly, the test based on a test of an error correction term can consider both CE and WE. 
Finally, the model can cope with more than one error correction term. As can be observed from 
Table 3 above, similar conclusions can be drawn in relation to cointegration in terms of the 
significance of the error correction term as can be observed from the p values related to the first 
two elements in the last column. The next p.value in the column is associated with a small test 
statistic and this implies insignificance; this arises as the third variable is weakly exogenous for. 
By sequentially estimating the error correction models it is possible to determine whether a series 
is weakly exogenous or not, but this may not be the best approach and it relates to a specific choice 
of r in each case. 
 
It is now possible to turn to the VAR and the Johansen test applied to the simulated data to see 
whether this similarly calibrated data set gives rise to similar results. 
 
Table 4 Tests of cointegration, WE, LE and Parallel pricing for simulated data. 
Hypothesis Null Statistic [p.value] 
Cointegration  r  1   r ≤ 2  −Tln1 −  i 
77.3650.000∗∗   
(WE)| r  2   p1    1i =0, for i  1,2  22  77.3750.0000∗∗   
                 p2    2i =0, for i  1,2  22  93.5920.0000∗∗   
                   p3    3i =0, for i  1,2  22  1.68190.4313   
(LE)| r  2    p1    j1 =0, for j  1,2   22  76.5700.0000∗∗   
                  p2    j2 =0, for j  1,2   22  86.6980.0000∗∗   
                  p3    j3 =0, for j  1,2   22  92.9210.0000∗∗   
 
Normalization N
WEp3 |r  2   
 
11  22  1,
 21   12  0
3i  0, for i  1,2
 22  1.68190.4313   
 
Parallel Pricing|N
WEp3 |r  2   
  13   23  −1    24  2.28490.6835   
* Significant at the 5% level and ** significant at the 1% level. 
 
In Table 4 we find that there are two cointegrating vectors as occurs in the case of the actual data. 
It can be observed from the p values that the test is significantly different from zero in the case of 
the first two prices. The last price can be observed to be weakly exogenous for  as the test is small 
and the p.value exceeds .05, so it is not significant. The next block of tests is all consistent with 
each column in  being significantly different from zero. This implies that none of the prices may 
be long-run excluded. This also makes it possible to normalize the first vector on the first price and 
the second vector on the second price a requirement for identification according to Boswijk 
(1996). The knowledge that the third price is weakly exogenous implies that it is appropriate to 
condition the first and second vectors on the third price. Bauwens and Hunter (2000) term this an 
orientation, so the system is orientated towards the first two prices and the finding that the third 
simulated price is weakly exogenous for  implies that this orientation is unique (Burke and 
Hunter, 2005). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is a simplicity associated with the method that applies tests of stationarity to the problem 
(Forni, 2004). However, as is shown in Hunter and Tabaghdehi (2012) behind the simplicity are a 
number of problems. In particular, testing the reverse results and repeated testing when it is known 
that there are N-1 cointegrating vectors at most. Then the common factor restriction inherent in the 
DF/ADF test binds the same behaviour to the short-run and the long-run. However, when the time 
series is not extensive then it may be that there is no alternative that make sense and it is also 
possible to extend the approach to the panel context (Beirne et al, 2007, Hadri, 2000, and Giulietti 
et al, 2010). Error correction models may have a similar felicity of application and possibility of 
extension to the panel case and they also have some further benefits in regard to testing (Kremers 
et al, 1992). 
 
However, stationarity might have been rejected in the context of DF equations, because: the tests 
perform poorly with relatively small samples (Podivinsky and King, 2000); the test has a less 
appropriate null (Hosken and Taylor, 2004) or the proportionality restriction required to test 
stationarity as compared with cointegration is too restrictive (Hunter, 2003). Key variables may 
also be omitted from the long-run so the dynamic equations do not meet the conditions required for 
separate estimation and inference (Hunter and Burke, 2007 and Kurita, 2008). The method may be 
reasonable when price proportions well characterize the data, the information sets are short and the 
geographic context as is discussed by Hosken and Taylor (2004) is the primary concern. 
 
If more data are available, then a much richer piece of analysis is possible. Cointegration across the 
system gives rise to a set of long-run relations that are tested jointly. This approach can be further 
analyzed in terms of long-run exogeneity to distinguish between parallel pricing and aggressive 
price leadership considered by Markham (1951) and as relates to the notion of weak exogeneity 
(Hunter and Burke, 2007 and Kurita, 2008). Furthermore, long-run causality may also be 
considered in the context of CE (Hunter, 1990) that is an essential pre-requisite to determining the 
short-run concept of Granger Causality (Giannini and Mosconi, 1992). This can be analyzed in 
terms of separability in the market and with further study of the market structure this form of 
analysis may be able to pick out anti-trust behaviour, with a geographic dimension. As Hosken and 
Taylor (2004) suggest this may even occur when it may not be possible more generally to 
distinguish between arbitrage pricing and price leadership. 
 
Here all the analysis seems to accept that there is arbitrage in the long-run. However, the tests for 
WE imply that these relations are driven by the LA prices. This implies that the prices in LA do not 
reflect behaviour in the other regions and the price behaviour in LA can be seen as defining the 
stochastic trend. It seems unusual that the long-run is forced by LA, but this finding may be useful 
as an early warning to trigger further investigation. Furthermore, regulatory bodies would be well 
advised not to consider further concentration in the industry and to provide incentives to stimulate 
procedures by which the price behaviour in the other regions is better reflected in those that apply 
to LA. 
 
As with the concept of causality the notion of weak exogeneity is embedded in the system. So 
extending the data set to more regions may give rise to different conclusions. A further concern is 
that the GC can in isolation be seen as weakly exogenous for, but subject to LA being weakly 
exogenous, it is then only possible for GC prices to be cointegrating exogenous for .1. This 
implies that the long-run relations associated with GC prices are not reflecting what happens in NY 
and this is a further signal of imperfection. It should be noted that finding a system with N-1 
long-run relations all satisfying the pure error correction terms related to parallel prices is also 
consistent with what is termed Long-run Equilibrium Price Targeting by Burke and Hunter (2011). 
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i See the discussion by Forni (2004) of the residual demand approach and any analysis that draws on the calculation of elasticities. 
Hosken, O'Brien, Scheffman and Vita (2002) consider demand studies based on systems to analyze the appropriateness of 
horizontal mergers. And Froeb and Werden (1998) discuss the use of the difference in the Herfindahl Hirschman index to assess 
welfare gains through mergers in homogenous product markets. There is also discussion of consumer surplus and following that 
consumer detriment (Hunter et al, 2001). 
ii The Dutch regulator (Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit) has applied tests of non-stationarity to challenge mobile service 
providers (KPN, Orange and Vodafone) over the competitiveness of their pricing. However, the report by London Economics that 
analyses the Dutch market has been strongly criticized by Hunter (2003). The methods applied were incoherent and the data not 
sufficient to prove the case. 
iii Forni (2004) makes the valid point that following Engle and Granger (1987) the series ought to be of the same order of 
integration for the test to be appropriately applied, but this suggestion gives the approach a broader appeal. So it should be 
anticipated that these series ought to be similar when they relate to an appropriately defined market. Furthermore, in the context of 
I(2) series as is explained in Johansen (1995) and Burke and Hunter (2005) the stationary combination may exist but not in the form 
considered by Engle and Granger (1987). Hence, the broad market definition may be wrongly rejected, because the wrong estimator 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
is applied. Similarly, the series may be fractionally integrated and again cointegration may be wrongly rejected when the I(1) 
approach is incorrectly thought to provide an acceptable approximation. 
iv It should be noted that Forni (2004), cited by London Economics, applies both the ADF and the KPSS test, which uses the null of 
stationarity. When stationarity is an issue both of these tests should be considered. However, the stationarity test due to Leybourne 
and McCabe (1994) and the KPSS test used by Forni (2004) came under significant scrutiny by Caner and Killian (2001) who 
suggest that the tests under the null of stationarity perform relatively poorly. Sekioua and Karanasos (2006) provide evidence for 
the superior performance of the Generalised Least Squares Dickey Fuller test. 
v Beirne et al (2007) suggest for the case of the real exchange rate that the relevant concept is that a sequence of exchange rates or 
relative prices are stationary on average. This leads to a tension between applying univariate tests where one may concentrate on 
specification of an underlying time series model and define corrected specifications, as compared with the panel approach where 
key aspects of the specification are assumed to be homogeneous. For the panel estimations presented in Beirne et al (2007) they 
argue when the test used applies the null of stationarity that the test due to Hadri (2000) works well with excellent power and size 
properties when the time dimension exceeds 50. It should be noted that Giulietti et al (2010) have had less success in this context 
though the electricity price data they use is more likely to be sensitive to non-linearity. 
vi More generally, the restrictions can be imposed and the likelihood re-evaluated to test propositions on the cointegrating vectors 
using a likelihood ratio test (Johansen and Juselius, 1992, and Giannini and Mosconi, 1992), this will be considered in more detail 
in the next section. 
vii Hendry and Juselius (2001) might be viewed as an analysis of a price system conditioned on other variables, more generally 
these variables and the underlying identification of long-run demand phenomena would seem to direct one to a more structural 
analysis (see La Cour and Møllgaard, 2002). Hunter and Ioannidis (2001) considered the role of demand systems developed from 
non-stationary data. 
viii Underlying this proposition is the idea that competitive pricing is driven in the long-run by cost with relatively homogenous 
products without significant quality differences. Though using the hedonic pricing framework should be able to capture primary 
differences in quality (see discussion in Hunter et al, 2001). 
ix  In the case of the VAR(q) model -(I - 1 ... q-1). 
x The notion that prices within a market move in proportion is somewhat simplistic, but when stationarity is used to test for 
inappropriate pricing by firms the range of factors that might be introduced to generate a stationary process is likely to be restricted. 
For example, in the case of PPP, the Balassa-Samuelson effect would suggest the inclusion of a trend in PPP models when the data 
compares developed with less developed economies. The trend captures a gap in the rate of technological progress between the two 
economies. But a trend that explains differences in sectoral price differentials might be inappropriate as it is likely to be viewed 
illegitimate not to pass gains due to technological change on to the consumer. 
xi Here the focus is on parallel pricing as the cointegration and stationarity approaches correspond exactly, but CE is not trivial 
when the problem is looked at in terms of Long-run Equilibrium Price Targeting (LEPT), which in relation to this algebra is an 
exact analogue of parallel pricing. For this reason Hunter and Burke (2007) impute with LEPT the concept of CE best relates to the 
case where there are two stochastic trends or rank()=N-2. 
xii It may make more sense to view the simulated data as relating to the information corrected for short run dynamics by the 
Johansen methodology that transforms the underlying relations to multivariate random walks (Johansen, 1995). 
